

REVIEW ESSAYS

SPINOZA AND US

BODIES, MASSES, POWER: SPINOZA AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES by Warren Montag. New York: Verso, 1999. 136 + xxi pp.

COLLECTIVE IMAGININGS: SPINOZA, PAST AND PRESENT by Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd. New York: Routledge, 1999. 169 pp.

THE NEW SPINOZA (THEORY OUT OF BOUNDS) edited by Warren Montag and Ted Stolz. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1997. 258 + xvix pp.

The gentlemen . . . have endeavored by various ways and promises to draw him back from his evil ways; and not being able to remedy him, but on the contrary, receiving every day more news about the horrible heresies he practiced . . . and the awful deeds he performed . . . they resolved that the said . . . be put to the ban and banished . . . as indeed they proclaim the following *herem* on him:

“By the decree of the Angels and the word of the Saints we ban, cut off, curse and anathemize . . . with all the curses written in the Torah; Cursed be he by day and cursed by night. Cursed in his lying down and cursed in his waking up, cursed in his going forth and cursed in his coming in; and may the Lord not want his pardon, and may the Lord’s wrath and zeal burn upon him.”

We warn that none may contact him orally or in writing, nor do him any favor, nor stay under the same roof with him, nor read any paper he made or wrote.¹

No, this is not a curse hurled against Jacques Derrida in *The New York Review of Books*. It is an official excommunication from Judaism delivered by the elders of the Ruling Council in Amsterdam on 27 July 1656 to the 24-year-old Baruch d’Espinoza. Baruch’s parents had been Marrano Christians, those in Portugal and Spain who were first compelled to convert to Christianity and then subjected to inquisition over the depth of the conversion. Many Marranos fled to Holland, as did Baruch’s parents, joining a synagogue in Amsterdam. But the young Baruch—as he was called before changing his name to Benedict after the curse—found himself unable to endorse

either Jewish or Christian orthodoxy. Somehow, the toll the two dogmas took on the stubborn lad released a new adventure of thought, one that confounded the philosophical theologies of his day and continues to puzzle philosophers outside those circles. One thing seems clear: Baruch—who lost his mother and father at an early age, who was excommunicated from Judaism, who was nonetheless labeled a Jewish philosopher by Christians who knew his work, and who withheld his major book from publication out of prudence—encountered early and often the ruptures of being and the volatility of passion.

Sounds like a good recipe for a transcendental philosophy in which the purity of reason rises above the unruly passions. But Baruch, er, Benedict, eventually cooked up a new dish. His metaphysical monism refuses the dualism of God/nature and mind/body and is not reducible to finalism either; it seems to depict a complex materialism in which “God or Nature” is immanent in the movement of things rather than forming a commanding order above them. His philosophy thus became dangerous to discuss and hard to fathom. Yet, Kant and Hegel later found it necessary to articulate their systems through engagement with it. And a diverse crew of thinkers has expressed indebtedness to him. Lessing, Goethe, Nietzsche, Bergson, Bertrand Russell, Leo Strauss, Louis Althusser, Stuart Hampshire, Gilles Deleuze, Harry Frankfurt, Etienne Balibar, and Antonio Negri belong to that club.

Take Stuart Hampshire. After writing a fine study of Spinoza in the 1960s,² Hampshire himself embraced a layered materialism in which confused and vague affects of the body are elevated by corporeal techniques and reflexive thought into a refined ethic of thought-imbued dispositions. Hampshire, while dissolving the aura of demonstration with which Spinoza surrounded his metaphysic, joins Spinoza in resisting variants of a two-world metaphysic authoritatively invoked by Augustine, Maimonides, Newton, and Kant. Hampshire is unconvinced by contemporary efforts to reduce morality to obligation while shedding all vestiges of the two-world metaphysic in which such an understanding was previously set:

It is at least possible that Spinoza is right in his opinion that traditional ethics is the pursuit of an illusion, and that gradually, in the course of years, he may be shown to be right. . . . The confirmation, if it comes, will not be like the confirmation of an empirical hypothesis. . . . Rather the confirmation would be that some notions closely resembling Spinoza's key notions become widely accepted as peculiarly appropriate in studying and in evaluating human behavior. New psychological knowledge might fit better into this framework than into any other. . . . Certainly anyone who altogether rejects Spinoza's naturalistic standpoint, and anyone who has some religious and transcendental ground for his moral beliefs, would remain unpersuaded, and given his premises, justifiably so.

But those of us who have no such transcendental grounds may at least pause and consider the possibility that our habitual moralizing about the ends of action is altogether mistaken. Certainly, we should not deceive ourselves by dismissing Spinoza as the kind of determinist who allows no possibility of deliberate self-improvement, as if this were the dividing line between him and the traditional moralists. It is not.³

A few points deserve attention. First, Hampshire's reference to future psychological work is prescient. For the new neurophysiology of body/brain/culture relations now emerging resists both the dualism of theological philosophies (without disproving them) and the mechanical materialism often offered as a counter to it. These explorations of different brains in the network that vary according to speed, capacity, and initiating power, and that interpret affective messages sent from other bodily zones, may be closer in spirit to the philosophy of Spinoza as articulated in Books II through IV of the *Ethics* than to any other great thinker in the premodern West. Second, Hampshire's characteristic modesty when it comes to fundamentals—"anyone who has some religious . . . ground . . . would remain unpersuaded, and justifiably so"—tracks a corollary element of modesty and appreciation of diversity in Spinoza. For while the latter may have sought to demonstrate philosophical monism, he also tied it to a political diversity that flows from the wide diversity of contingent "compositions" to which humans are susceptible. Third, Hampshire draws inspiration from Spinoza to craft a sophisticated liberalism, appreciative of the complex connections between affect and thought, attuned to the layered complexity of culture, receptive to multiple ways in which individuals and constituencies are composed, and hospitable to the variety of fundamental moral sources actually entering into public life. And fourth, Hampshire calls on the transcendentalists among us to think twice, or even three times, before they still the disturbance of nontranscendent orientations to ethics, being, and politics by convicting the perpetrators of self-contradiction, amoralism, or worse. Hampshire knows that the passions Spinoza encountered are still in circulation, though their styles of expression have changed.

The books reviewed here share with Hampshire a desire to draw sustenance from Spinoza today. *The New Spinoza* presents fascinating essays by theorists such as Althusser, Irigaray, Deleuze, Macherey, and Balibar, in which readings of Spinoza as an arid rationalist are shaken up and through which the project of radical democracy is explored. We limit ourselves to one example, the essay by Gilles Deleuze on "Spinoza and the Three 'Ethics.'"

When you begin the *Ethics*, Deleuze says, it appears to be a serene system in which each element is said to follow necessarily from a set of evident axioms. But then you encounter the "scholia," those energetic side statements

that seem indispensable to the spirit of the text but are not neatly subsumable under its logic. The scholia speak to the affective dimension of being that subsists below our highest powers of ratiocination but is also indispensable to its activation and movement. Affect is the motor of being. It is divisible into negative passions generated from the outside and energetic actions incorporated into the higher thinking of individuals and groups. Spinoza, moreover, does not just *say* that affect is indispensable to being. His text *moves* us affectively, as it raises thinking to a higher power.

A sign, according to Spinoza, can have several meanings, but it is always an *effect*. An effect is first of all the trace of one body upon another. . . . It is an *affectio*, for example, the effect of the sun upon our body. . . . We know our affections through the ideas we have, sensations or perceptions, sensations of heat and color. . . . Affection is therefore not only an instantaneous effect of a body [the sun] upon my own, but also has an effect on my own duration, a pleasure or pain, a joy or sadness. These are passages, becomings . . . that pass from one state to another. . . . They are signs . . . that are vectorial . . . and no longer scalar like the affections, sensations, or perceptions. (P. 21)

Are these mobile, confused idea-intensities simply anathema to the rational ideas that Spinoza spins out on the geometrical level? There are things in Spinoza that encourage such a reading. But those scholia do punctuate the text, and many readers are inspired by them. Perhaps these energies infuse the higher intellect itself as it forms more “adequate” ideas from them.

But when one asks *how* we manage to form a concept, or how we rise from effects to causes, it is clear that at least certain signs must serve as a springboard for us, and that certain affects must give us the necessary vitality. (P. 25)

So Deleuze links Book II of the *Ethics* to Book V by a movement of inner vitality, he explores thinking as it proceeds across affective levels of being, and he encourages the signs activated by the scholia to infuse the ethics of the higher intellect. For Spinoza thinks it is possible to move through the negative passions induced by daily servitude and traditional theologies, partly by participating in the intellectual joy internal to the ethic he supports.

This selection of affects is the very condition for leaving the first kind of knowledge and for attaining the concept through the acquisition of sufficient power. (P. 26)

And the

cries of the language of signs are the mark of this battle of passions, of joys and sadnesses, of increases and decreases of power. (P. 26)

The scholia insert themselves by jolts and bumps into the putative demonstrative chain. By the time you get to Book V, where ethics and joy are officially joined, a feeling for the connection already reverberates inside your ideas. The *Ethics* of the definitions and demonstrations is a “river bed”; the scholia “is a book of fire, subterranean.”

The study by Gatens and Lloyd is inspired by a Deleuzian reading of Spinoza, as well as by the broadly sympatico reading by Antonio Negri.⁴ The Spinozist imagination, Gatens and Lloyd say, is not simply overcome by the higher intellect. As a vague, volatile set of intensive ideas, the imagination sets a preliminary condition to the machinations of the higher intellect. What is more, its effects are carried forward through those concatenations.

This tenacity of the image in no way suggests a flaw in human nature; it just is the mind's confrontation with body—the nature of the mind as idea of body. An image understood, nonetheless, has a different place in the life of the mind from that of an image whose causes are not understood. (P. 37)

Like the imagination, private dreams and collective illusions also provide grist for the higher intellect even as they set obstacles to its organization. The European images of free will and a personal God are two such illusions. The image of the will plays on several keys of experience: first, the innocent sense in consciousness itself of acting on the world as if there were no prior cause in your action; second, Judeo-Christian stories of human beings as agents of free will formed in the darkened image of a willful God who created the world from scratch; and third, cultural experiences of internal subjection and external subordination that encourage people to imagine freedom separate from determination and to hope for salvation after life. Gatens and Lloyd show that Spinoza's task is not to expurgate “illusions” flowing through the collective imagination. It is to show how such an imagination itself embodies a crude interpretation that can be translated into a higher, more encompassing one. He does so, first, by translating the story of Genesis as a willful fall from grace into that of children retroactively attributing free will to themselves and harsh punishment to a divine parent under the delirious influence of the toxic fruit they ate after the God prudentially warned them against doing so and, second, by articulating a conception of freedom that makes sense of the imagination of free will while rising above it.

Augustine, Kant, and others have defended a free will that rises above natural causation. But in doing so, each has also been driven toward the idea of an essentially divided will not susceptible to full control by the very agents

said to be responsible for it.⁵ For Spinoza, freedom is not exempt from causation. To be free is to translate causes represented in illusory stories into those grasped by the understanding and *also* modified through the concatenations of the understanding. Gatens and Lloyd compare Spinoza to the Stoics who also linked freedom and causation together.

By aligning our impulses with a pre-ordained good, we achieve the only true freedom. But this alignment of individual choice with fate is cognitive rather than volitional—an exercise not of what we call free will but of knowledge. (P. 45)

Spinoza, though, rejects the idea of a preordained good and the metaphysical finalism in which it is set. While there is tension in his system, Gatens and Lloyd show how his causality has a more open horizon. And cognition and volition are mixed together in his thought. So, what is freedom? It may dwell in the critical difference that the work of the higher intellect makes on both the *complexity* of the images it works on and the actor's *identification* with acts that flow through the lower registers into the higher intellect. Once an image, dream, or illusion is lifted into the higher intellect and subjected to coherence tests, it becomes more fully part of you; but equally important, when the intellect works on the intensive images, it gives more refined expression to that which is already embodied and continues to leave traces on the lower register. It is now both more entirely yours and more refined. Freedom may, for Spinoza, resolve into this flow of imagination, concatenation, expression, and layered identification. Thinking is thus crucial to freedom because it makes a difference to the affective materials on which it works; it recrafts intensive proto-thoughts without leaving them behind. It forms a critical link between expression, identification, and action. It thereby participates in freedom, particularly when you recall how the compositions we form with others enter into the thinking process. If, as Gatens and Lloyd do, you move toward a conception of thinking as layered activity, you can both link freedom to causation and show how the vibrancy of thinking is what gives freedom its peculiar, self-gratifying character. Such ideas are discernible in the Gatens and Lloyd reading, though not stated in the words composed here.

Even if you join Hampshire, as I do, in rejecting Spinoza's claim that everyone would concur on his metaphysical system after sufficient work of concatenation, Spinoza's emphasis on the connection between thinking as layered activity and freedom as expressive still carries power. Freedom now becomes more diversified individually and culturally. Indeed, when Harry Frankfurt emphasizes "the importance of what you care about," he articulates

something also crucial in Spinoza's thought.⁶ For to express in action what you care most about is part of what it means to act freely; and, according to Spinoza, to act on what you care about on reflection gives vent to the *joy* of living in a way that insinuates itself into the quality of your relations with others. So freedom is linked to expression, and both are connected to joy and the ethical life. A free society, to the extent that one can be developed in a world made up of finite beings infiltrated by the play of passion and imagination, is one that infuses an ethos of generosity into the common life. That is why Spinoza defended freedom of expression so vigorously. As, to take one instance, when writing to a Christian physicist he said, "The freedom to philosophize, and to say what we think. This I desire to vindicate in every way, for here it is always suppressed through the excessive authority and egotism of preachers."⁷

Today, in the wake of horrendous holocausts, the term "presumptive" must be inserted in front of Spinoza's faith, Hampshire's conviction, Deleuze's fire, Frankfurt's formula, and the Gatens and Lloyd's insights. That qualifier builds hesitation not into freedom of expression but into the freedom to do what you care about most. This would not surprise Spinoza. He knows that natural, finite beings do not rise entirely or consistently above the play of untutored passion and imagination. The insertion of such a qualification takes away the "counterexamples" small minds marshal to dismiss such a vision, often doing so to reinvolve a free will itself plagued by puzzles and counterexamples. With this qualification, Spinoza sets into motion a modern conception of freedom worthy of attention. And he accentuates the significance of thinking for life.

Collective Imaginings continues down this trail. It explores Spinoza's engagements with theology, the politics of difference, and the question of individual and collective responsibility for past actions. The last chapter explores how a contemporary Spinozist might respond to the call for collective responsibility on the part of descendants of European settlers who conquered aboriginal lands and minoritized the people already there. It speaks eloquently to an issue that as we shall see, Montag also raises. This book is a lucid, compelling introduction to Spinoza, one that discloses his pertinence to us today.

Warren Montag, following above all the lead of Antonio Negri, seeks to heighten the visibility of "the multitude" in Spinoza's political writings. The multitude is not reducible to "the people." For that entity excludes many segments of a populace such as—at different times—women, children, convicts, workers, slaves, and servants. And it focuses on the juridical capacities of the

populace it does encompass, treating them in their rational capacities, or their ability to form contracts, or their highest civic virtue. The multitude, a force no regime can afford to ignore when it is mobilized, is an essentially ambiguous formation. It can be the site of volatile passions that threaten minorities and heretics such as Spinoza, and it can become a force crucial to freedom and democratic politics.

Spinoza is ambivalent about the multitude. As one who was excommunicated by a persecuted minority, who was often treated as a pariah by the Christian majority, and who had intellectual friends literally ripped to shreds by an enraged mob, he fears it. But he also identifies with it, as he comes to see how its health is bound up with freedom and generosity in politics. When the multitude is weighed down by fear, it is by turns resigned and dangerous; when formed through compositions that foster individual joy and collective serenity, its positive possibilities glow.

Montag resists a "Straussian" reading of Spinoza's relation to the multitude. Spinoza, according to him, delineates no final division between an intellectual elite and the multitude, nor does he finally support an ideal in which a cultural elite feeds the multitude indulgent stories in order to release itself to think higher thoughts and, if lucky, participate in ruling the state. According to Montag, we are all part of the multitude, in that we live in a world where imagination, dreams, passions, and other material forces compose daily life. The multitude must be raised to a higher level of being if any group is to develop its highest capacities of joy, thought, freedom, and governance.

Montag himself participates in an elite of the left, one that claims it will dissolve into the multitude if and as the latter becomes democratized. It is not easy to decide which elite to worry about most: a self-styled permanent elite or a self-styled temporary elite. In the contemporary context, Montag's gang seems less worrisome, though the balance might shift if—to use his language—the existing equilibrium of social forces were to change significantly.

Montag's Spinoza started to engage the positive potential of the multitude, and his mature system suggests that this is the way to go. But events of the day pulled him back. He retreated toward a juridical conception of freedom, diversity, and tolerance that has much in common with the juridical liberalism that prevailed subsequently. Principles, ideas, laws, and moral obligations carry little real weight unless they are invested in the bodies that state them. For such investments to occur, a democratic composition of bodies is needed, a composition in which individuals are strengthened by their connections to others rather than weakened and made resentful through them. For,

again, Montag's Spinoza—unlike his Hobbes—is not a theorist of the self-interested individual and the absolutist state; he is a philosopher of social compositions in which parties are strengthened or weakened by the character of the combinations that form them.⁸

Spinoza officially rejects the metaphysical dualism that places thought in a realm separate from bodies and things, but does the juridical conception of politics tempting him pull him back toward that dualism? Montag thinks so. Here is one formulation of the issue.

Spinoza's rejection of dualism has brought him to this pass or, rather, impasse: it appears as if he would prefer to abandon even this broken chain of reasons rather than to arrive at two seemingly inevitable conclusions and thereby face their necessary historical and political consequences: 1) there can be no liberation of the mind without a corresponding liberation of the body and 2) there can be no individual salvation that is not part of a collective salvation. (P. 36)

Montag is insightful in exploring a positive politics of the multitude lurking in Spinoza's conception of democracy. But what if, in the spirit of the Spinozas presented by Hampshire, and Gatens and Lloyd, respectively, we inserted a qualification? The juridical element of law, rights, and protections, while insufficient to democratic pluralism, does form a critical part of it. To honor it need not pull Spinoza toward a transcendental model of thought, judgment, and obligation. For thinking, according to him, forms a distinctive element *within* the material world, and an institutionalized set of rights, obligations, and restraints can be said to form an important part of that world even if it does not exhaust it. Perhaps Montag himself is on the verge of reinserting a dualism here, this time inverting the priority of the two substances. It seems to me that Montag's book can profitably be read in critical relation to the discussion of freedom in Hampshire, Gatens and Lloyd, and also to a forthcoming book by John Docker, a study that charts Spinoza's rocky journey through the world and plays up the importance in his day and ours of the commitment to diversity and freedom of expression.⁹

At any rate, I embrace a productive ambivalence toward the multitude and rights that might be foreshadowed in Spinoza. It is precisely because we are all part of the multitude—because we enter into social compositions and participate in the life of passion and volatility—that it is important to institutionalize freedom of expression through law. But it is also because the history of rights is pockmarked by severe exclusions that seem at specific moments to follow from the very idea of God, or personhood, or civilizational imperatives, or economic necessity, or all four that every historical catalog of rights must periodically be subjected to political movements that shake it and the

institutional arrangements it is nested in up from below. No abstract principle suffices to dissolve this ambivalence *within* the multitude and the practice of rights; even if each time a surprising right is added to the ledger, a bevy of dialecticians can be counted on to insist after the fact that it was “implicit” in the principle all along. That is one way in which ethics and politics are underdetermined by principle.

To participate in Spinoza’s ethical sensibility—and to share his realism about the risks and possibilities of collective life in a volatile world—is today to support an ambivalent orientation toward rights. Rights, first, are essential. When joyful compositions constitute a large portion of life, people are likely to broaden the compass of rights and freedoms. And when health care, working conditions, housing, education, and familial supports are ample, such compositions are more apt to flourish. But second, uncertainty and happenstance circulate within the actual composition of rights at any time. So, it is also pertinent to cultivate responsiveness to exclusions in the practice of rights sustained by those compositions. I suspect that Montag’s reservations about the philosophy of rights could be curtailed if a double-entry orientation to the practice was explicitly affirmed. Indeed, his own critique of Spinoza, as we shall now see, speaks to the importance of the second gesture.

Spinoza shared with many who followed him in the next few centuries a hesitancy to press against the practices of territorial conquest and slavery on which the consolidation of European commercial society rested. Tocqueville on the conquest of Amerindians provides for me a late instance of that tendency.¹⁰ Montag himself explores in a thoughtful chapter why Locke looked back to the slave revolt of Spartacus as an unjust assault against a reasonable order. But Spinoza, Montag says, also admitted into his philosophy resources with the capacity to disturb this limit in his thought.

In 1664, Spinoza reported a strange and disturbing dream to a friend, a dream containing one of those intense images that sometimes do surprising work when propelled into the higher intellect. The image of an intolerable, anonymous “black and mangy Brazilian” haunted him. He did not know what to do with it. Was the actual freedom to which the European man of letters was attached bonded to suppressing Europe’s exploitative relation to Africa and the New World? Can attachment to freedom as the highest end become a secret barrier to acknowledging injustice? Perhaps. But Spinoza’s joyous materialism, his own experience with the traumas of the outcast, and the resultant richness of his dream life also contained the potential of generating critical responsiveness to this issue. Montag’s final paragraph provides the closing words here too:

The unfinished last chapter 11, 'Of Democracy', of Spinoza's last work ends with the words of his anonymous editor, *reliqua desiderantur*, 'the remainder is lacking'. After Spinoza's words cease, an image, or perhaps an after image, lingers in the space of the lack. In the silence of a winter morning, a dream silence, an intolerable Brazilian stands motionless before him . . . the battle scarred rebel slave who does not need to speak. Why does he so frighten Spinoza? Perhaps because, like a mute shade before the door of the underworld, he beckons him to begin the journey in search of that other that Spinoza's philosophy must become in order to be itself. (P. 123)

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NOTES

1. Folio 408 of *Livro dos Acordos da Nacam*, as quoted in Yirmiyahu Yovel, *Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Marrano of Reason* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 3.
2. Stuart Hampshire, *Spinoza* (London: Faber and Faber, 1960).
3. Stuart Hampshire, *Freedom of the Mind* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 203-4.
4. The two Deleuze books are *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, trans. by R. Hurley (San Francisco: Zone, 1988) and *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, trans. by M. Joughin (New York: Zone, 1992). Antonio Negri's is *The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics*, trans. by Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). Negri charts a crisis during a break in the writing of the *Ethics*, one in which the formalism of Part I eventually gives ground to the immanent materialism of Parts II-IV.
5. I explore these issues with respect to Augustine in *The Augustinian Imperative: Reflections on the Politics of Morality* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1993) and with respect to Kant in *Why I Am Not A Secularist* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), chaps. 5 and 7.
6. *The Importance of What We Care About* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988). In a later essay titled "Two Motivations for Rationalism: Descartes and Spinoza," in his *Necessity, Volition, and Love* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Frankfurt concludes that Descartes and Spinoza develop divergent strategies to achieve harmony with the world: the strategy of the rebel and of the mystic. "The rebel and the mystic share a desire to overcome the discrepancy between themselves and what is other than themselves, one by changing the world to suit himself and the other by merging himself into the external order" (p. 53). I imagine that Gatens and Lloyd, Negri, Deleuze, and Montag would find both the rebel and the mystic circulating through Spinoza.
7. Letter XXX, in *Spinoza: The Letters*, ed. by Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1995), 185.
8. But a new Hobbes is also emerging today to join the new Spinoza. Richard Flathman's *Thomas Hobbes: Skepticism, Individuality and Chastened Politics* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993) presents a Hobbes who could enter into productive dialogue with Spinoza on the topics of diversity, ethics, and generosity. Richard Tuck's *Hobbes* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989) moves in a similar direction. A generous reading of each thinker in relation to the other could be very productive.

9. John Docker, *1492: The Poetics of Diaspora* (London: Continuum, 2001).

10. I examine how Tocqueville's engagement with Amerindians already inhabiting the land of America compromises his model of democratic pluralism in Chapter 6 of *The Ethos of Pluralization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995). Both Amerindians and American pluralism have suffered from the hegemony of this perspective.

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